I Introduction
Entrepreneurship, innovation, and venture capital (VC) are pivotal to success in economic development, as they provide for wealth creation and a rising standard of living. Over the past decade, extensive research has been done to compare the performance of VC financing in European Union (EU) countries to those in the U.S. (Black and Gilson, 1998; Bottazi and Da Rin, 2002; Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli, 2006; Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher, 2009 ).
Differences in stock market development, contract and tax legislation, labor market regulations, and entrepreneurial spirit, have been often cited in connection to the consistent underperformance of European VC investments relative to their American counterparts. Even as recently as the pre-crisis period of [2005] [2006] [2007] , there have been no signs of a decrease in the performance gap between European and Americian VC investments (Raade and Dantas Machado, 2008) .
Although VC financing has experienced rapid growth over the last two decades (Aizenman and Kendall, 2008; Kraeussl and Wuebker, 2011) , the literature is still lacking a comprehensive analysis of whether this performance gap is not solely explained by a "Europe is lagging behind" argument, but may also be attributable to industry-specific and/or financing stage specific characteristics. Therefore, the objective of our study is to determine whether VC-backed companies active in specific industries across countries and within countries are more likely to become profitable so that venture capitalists can exit successfully.
A typical VC fund is liquidated after one decade. Consequently, if a VC-backed portfolio company does not have sufficient potential to be exited before the end of a decade, a venture capitalist is unlikely to invest in the company. Successful exits are critical to these investors to ensure attractive returns and, in turn, to raise additional capital. However, interest in certain industries by public investors is susceptible to change and, as such, it is not equally easy to exit investments of all types at all times (Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001) . For example, in recent years, "hot issue markets" like Computer Hardware, Biotechnology, Multimedia, and Internet companies have appeared and disappeared. Concerns about the ability to exit investments may have led to too many private equity transactions being undertaken in these "hot" industries (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Lerner, 2002) . On the flip side, industries that are not in the public spotlight may have received only insufficient funds. This causes an imbalance in the distribution of VC across different industries.
We explore whether venture capitalists in certain industries are more likely to exit their investments via initial public offerings (IPOs), sales, or by means of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). To this end, we examine VC investments and exits in the U.S. and 13 EU countries over the period , while further classifying firms into six distinct industries. The wide dimensionality of our data set (whose characteristics we describe in detail in Section II) allows us to uncover significant relationships and common factors that lead to VC-backed firms completing the exit phase. We also seek to understand the institutional features and the legal environment associated with successful VC financing in the U.S. and in Europe.
Another relevant issue that we address in this paper is the asymmetry in performance between VC-backed firms at different investment stages (i.e., seed/start-up and early stage firms versus mature firms) and its effect on the performance gap. As shown by Jeng and Wells (2000) , early and later stage venture investments are affected quite differently by the determinants of VC. Hence, we intend to find out whether the weak performance of European early stage venture investments relative to the U.S., as documented by Raade and Dantas Machado (2008) , is more prevalent in certain industries.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first comprehensive comparative analysis between the success of European and American VC-backed portfolio companies. This allows us to uncover relationships and common factors that lead to a successful exit of VC-backed portfolio companies and, as a result, strong performance by VC funds. We control for industry-specific factors, investment stage, macroeconomic conditions, and the legal environment in the European countries and the U.S. that are known to affect the exiting environment. First, we explore for which industries the difference in success between VC-backed companies from 13 EU countries and the U.S. are most prominent and for which industries the performance gap is smallest. Subsequently, we try to identify whether perceptible differences exist between the successes of VC-backed companies that have received financing at an early stage vis-à-vis those that have received financing at a later stage. Finally, we break our sample into two sub-periods, 1985-1999 and 2000-2009 , in order to explicitly analyze whether the performance gap has narrowed (for specific industries) or, in other words, whether Europe has been able to catch up over the last years.
Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can be explained by country-specific factors (in particular, when considering early stage companies) there exist significant idiosyncratic differences in success across industries.
We find that, for instance, venture capitalists invested in companies active in the Biotech and the Health, Medical and Life Science sectors are significantly more likely to successfully exit these investments via IPOs, while those invested in companies active in the Computer industry and in the Communications and Media sector are more likely to successfully exit via mergers and acquisitions. Significant differences across industries also emerge when considering early stage versus later stage VC-backed companies and the preferred method of exit.
The findings of our sub-period analysis show that during the second sub-period of 2000-2009 the difference between the success of European and American VC-backed companies became smaller and that Europe indeed has been able to catch up. The number of European companies that received VC financing is almost at par with their American counterparts. Furthermore, successful exits by IPOs have converged as well although overall they have shown a worse performance relative to the first sub-period. However, with regard to exits by mergers and acquisitions of VC-backed companies the U.S. has clearly retained its edge over Europe.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide an overview of the data used in this study followed by a description of how we construct the different variables associated with VC success rate. Our initial empirical results based on a set of summary statistics are discussed in section III while section IV presents the results of our regression analyses based on probit models that allow us to identify the relative importance of different determinants in the probability of successful exit. Finally, section V concludes.
II.

Data and Measures
II.1 Sample
Our sample covers the period 1985-2009 and includes data on exits of VC-backed firms and several determinants for the U.S. and 13 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The remaining two of the original EU-15 countries -Greece and Luxembourg -were excluded from the analysis as a result of missing information for some variables. From here on out, we will refer to the group of 13 European countries that make up our sample as EU-13.
Data on VC-backed companies stem from VentureXpert, which includes data on VC and private equity firms, funds, financing rounds, industry benchmark statistics, and more. The variables include company specific information such as nation, date of the first round of financing, industry classification, and outcome/exit. Data on country specific variables (Gross Domestic Product, Population, and Research and Development figures) are obtained from Euromonitor and the SourceOECD database. We control for three legal system variables in our study: Rule of Law and Creditor Rights originate from the seminal paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , while a revised index for Anti-Director Rights was obtained from Spamann (2010) . The use of these variables in controlling for performance in financial markets has been motivated by the works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998 ), Cumming, Fleming and Schwienbacher (2006 ), and Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2009 .
In total, we have data on the evolution of 41,266 firms that received VC funding over the period . This data allows us to determine which investments venture capitalists exited -if at all -and how. Table I summarizes the composition of this data set; the statistics are presented by country, stage of development of the firm when it received its first round of VC financing (seed, start-up and early stage, or mature), and by industry. This latter classification is explained in more detail below. As expected, most VC-backed companies have their origin in the U.S. (27,583 making up approximately 2/3 of the entire sample). In contrast, for Portugal and Austria we collected information on only 250 and 222 firms, respectively.
<Insert Table I 
about here>
Given that this paper seeks to determine whether industry-specific factors play a significant role in determining the likelihood of a successful venture exit, it would be beneficial to obtain as many independent industry-specific variables as possible that match the industry categories used by VentureXpert. Following Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008) , we group firms into categories that exhibit similarities in technology and management expertise. To link the industry trend data to the firms obtained from VentureXpert we matched ISIC codes with the VentureXpert industry classifications as follows. We initially mapped out a categorization table of the VentureXpert industry classification system from its most broad level "Major Group" down to the most detailed level titled "Sub-category 3". Then, by evaluating each line on the ISIC category list, we assigned them to their appropriate VentureXpert Sub-category 3 listing. The outcome is the classification into six main industry groups: Computer Software and Hardware; Semi-conductors and Other Electronics; Biotechnology; Medical, Health and Life Sciences; Communications and Media; and Non-high Technology. This allows us to keep the main recipients of VC disbursements (Gompers and Lerner, 2001 ) separated, while allowing for a reasonable level of aggregation in the data that will assist us in our empirical analysis. Table I also indicates that for both the EU-13 and the U.S non-high tech is the sector with most transactions, while the smallest number of VC-backed firms can be found in semi-conductors and other electronics, and the biotech industry. Moreover, we can see a similar amount of infant firms (infant firms include seed, start-up, and early stage companies) as mature firms for the case of the U.S. In sharp contrast, there exists roughly a 5-to-2 ratio of mature vis-à-vis infant firms in the case of the EU-13, revealing a bias against the provision of early-stage financing in Europe.
In our empirical analysis, we split our sample into two sub-periods, 1985-1999 and 2000-2009 , which allows us to explicitly investigate whether Europe has been able to catch up with the U.S. with respect to successful exits of VC-backed firms. We note that it is unlikely that venture capitalists have exited firms that received their initial funding (i.e. first financing round) in recent years. Including these companies would likely bias our results downward. In order to address this issue, even though we consider exits that have occurred up until July 2009, we exclude from the sample companies that have been operating for less than 4 years after receiving their final round of venture funding. Hence, our sample includes companies that received funding through 2005 and exits that took place through July 2009. Other than correcting for this potential downward bias, an additional advantage of this sample split is that it provides an almost equal distribution of transactions across the two periods. We examine 20,283 firms that received VC between 1985 and 1999, and 20,983 that were VC-backed in or after the year 2000. We provide further details as to the composition of the data per sub-period in Section III.
II.2 Measuring Success
Studies that have analyzed to date historical performance for European and American VC investments utilize diverging computation methods for returns and, thus, varying results.
In particular, issues regarding definitions, investment classification and valuation but also self-reporting and survivorship biases make these performance figures difficult to compare. Previous studies that have dealt with how to compute returns on VC investments include Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) , who examine a sample of 248 hand-collected VC exits in Canada and the U.S., and Cochrane (2005) , who analyzes exits using VentureOne data. In order to measure success of an investment, ideally one would require data on the actual returns on venture capital funds" investments. Unfortunately, this is not possible because neither VentureOne nor VentureXpert, the two main databases, collect valuation data on all the companies that are or have been part of a VC fund. Therefore, we proceed to measure success as a binary variable: whether a venture capitalist has exited an investment; and if so, we also record the exit strategy present.
Following Gompers et al. (2008) , our proposed measure of "success" takes the type of exit of a particular company into consideration. We define Success by IPO (S1) as the number of firms that received VC financing, and were exited via IPO. Success by Merger or Acquisition (S2) is defined analogously, this time considering VC-backed firms that were either merged with or acquired by other firms. Finally, we introduce a measure of Overall Success (OS), which is the sum of S1 and S2.
We make one further classification, which consists of separating the performance of infant firms that received VC financing, from the performance of mature firms. For all company data we recorded whether the firm was seed/start-up or early stage at the time it received its first VC investment. Success of Infant Firms (IS) is computed as the number of seed, start-up, and early stage firms funded by venture capitalists who exited the firm by taking it public, or through a merger or acquisition. Similarly, Success of Mature Firms (MS) is computed as the number of mature firms funded by venture capitalists who exited the firm through any of the two above-mentioned channels.
The success variables are constructed by analyzing the final sample of VC-backed companies, where the investment domiciles are set equal to the companies" nations. The success variables are then ordered by country, by year, and by industry to obtain a success rate, which is defined as the number of VC-backed companies that were successfully exited in a given year for a given country divided by the total number of VCbacked companies for that given year and country. The year specified in this case is set to be equal to the year in which the firm received its first round investment. This means, for example, that the future success of all companies that received their first round of financing in the year 2000 would be attributed to the year the first investment round was received, in this case 2000, irrespective of the year in which they exited.
III Have European Countries Closed the Performance Gap?
In this section we provide a first answer to the questions as to whether there still exists a gap between the success rates of U.S. and European VC-backed portfolio companies; if this discrepancy has become more or less pronounced; and whether this can be explained by industry and/or investment stage specific characteristics by analyzing a set of sample statistics. We will begin by providing a comparison between the success rates by IPO (S1) and Merger and Acquisition (S2) of U.S. and European VC-backed companies over the two sub-periods. Then, we will explore whether a company"s investment stage affects the likelihood for success. Finally, we will present a comprehensive industry-by-industry analysis of success rates across the two regions, exit strategies, investment stages, and periods. The insights gained here will form the basis of the subsequent comprehensive regression analyses, which we perform in section IV.
III.1 Comparison of Success Rates by Exit Strategy
We begin by providing a comparison between the performance of the U.S. and European countries over the entire period of study, comparing their performances in both subperiods. Table II presents a breakdown of success rates of both U.S. and EU-13 VCbacked companies by exit strategy.
<Insert Table II (Black and Gilson, 1998; Murray and Marriott, 1998; Bottazi and Da Rin, 2002) . Finally, LBOs were particularly prevalent in the case of European firms (over 17 percent), but almost nonexistent when considering American firms (less than 2%). These results are also in line with the seminal paper by Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) and the recent empirical findings by Brau and Fawcett (2006) and Bancel and Mittoo (2009) who present in a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) substantial differences regarding the preferred exit strategy. European CFOs favor maintaining control of the firm while American
CFOs value the ability of the pre-IPO investors to exit and experience significant changes in ownership structure after the IPO.
Starting from the year 2000, our findings in Table II show that the VC success story has been a more balanced one -albeit not quite as successful as between the mid1980s and late 1990s. The number of European firms backed by VC is roughly equal to that of their American counterparts. The number of exits by IPO has also converged, although to a very low level of about six percent for all firms receiving funding; in fact, the average success rate for the 13 European countries is slightly higher than that for the U.S. Nevertheless, this mostly reflects a "cooling down" in overall IPO activity, as documented by Ritter and Welch (2002) and Gompers et al. (2008) .
Regarding mergers and acquisitions of VC-backed firms, a slowdown is also observable, albeit much less dramatic compared to the slowdown in IPO activity. Here, the U.S. has clearly retained its edge over Europe: while nearly 22 percent of American firms have merged or have been acquired by others, their European counterparts have only exhibited a less than 11 percent success rate during the same period. For illustration and comparison purposes, we once again report the percentage of exits via LBOs, which remained basically unchanged for European countries (16 percent), and slightly increased in the case of American firms to 5 percent. This is indicative that exit strategies chosen differ substantially between the U.S. and Europe: while acquisitions and mergers are more prevalent in American VC-backed firms, LBOs are a more frequent event for their European counterparts. We note that since LBOs do not necessarily constitute a successful exit, we do not include them when computing overall success for the reminder of the analysis.
III.2 Comparison of Success Rates by Investment Stage
Another decomposition that is worthwhile analyzing is whether the relative maturity of a firm receiving VC financing affects its likelihood of success. Jeng and Wells (2000) describe how early and later stage ventures are affected quite differently by the determinants of VC. To assess whether there are differences by areas and periods, Table   III displays the comparison of VC investments and success rates between the U.S. and
Europe separating infant and mature firms.
<Insert Table III about here> During the period between 1985 and 1999, roughly an equal number of mature vis-à-vis infant firms were financed in the U.S. On the contrary, for the average 13
European countries, mature firms receiving VC funds outnumbered infant firms by a larger than 3-to-1 ratio. However, given that the success rate for infant firms was slightly higher than that of mature firms for European countries (while it was roughly similar for the U.S.), the "survival" or ex-post ratio -i.e. the ratio of successful mature firms to infant firms -fell to 2.83 in Europe, while remaining close to par in the case of the U.S.
The analysis of the second period paints a grim picture for infant firms in Europe:
even though the ex-ante ratio between mature and infant firms is lower starting in 2000 (2.32), much of the underperformance in this period is due to the relatively low success rate for infant firms in Europe. Table III indicates that less than 1 in 8 infant firms exited either via IPO or M&A, while almost twice as many mature firms had a successful exit via these two channels. The outcome is that successful mature firms outnumber successful infant firms in Europe by nearly a 4-to-1 ratio; in contrast, for the U.S. the expost ratio after 2000 is again close to 1. and 30 percent probability of success both in Europe and the U.S.
III.3 Comparison of Success Rates by Industry
This section investigates whether there are significant differences in performance across the six different industries. Focusing on the first sub-period, our empirical findings included in Table IV provide an industry-by-industry summary analysis for 1985-1999.
Our results show that the U.S. outperforms Europe in success by acquisition in all sectors, and in success by IPO (albeit only marginally in computer hardware and software; medical, health and life sciences; and communications and media). Moreover, the U.S. outperforms Europe in success of early-stage firms, and in success of mature firms.
<Insert Table IV Gompers and Lerner (1998) , provides significantly higher returns when compared to other exit strategies. The observation that the Biotech sector is the "best" performer comes as no surprise -over the last decade, this sector has been identified as one of the thriving new industries in the U.S. (Gordon, 2002; Guo, Lev and Zhou, 2005 counterparts by ratios ranging between 3-to-2 and 5-to-2 depending on the particular industry. Finally, whereas the U.S. continues to dominate Europe in terms of the success of infant firms, the gap when it comes to mature companies has sharply decreasedmostly due to a fall in the success rates for U.S. firms -in all industries, except for the Medical, Health and Life Sciences sector.
IV.
Regression Analysis
In the following pages, we investigate which factors are associated with successful VC investments by means of a multivariate probit regression analysis. We begin by providing a brief discussion as to which indicators serve as a good proxy for determinants we expect to play a significant role in enhancing the likelihood of a successful exit by a VCbacked firm.
Venture Capital Investment by Industry Group
First of all, it is important to distinguish between funds raised and funds invested. A VC fund will raise resources each year; however, it may not necessarily invest those funds in the same year. VC funds are actively managing current portfolio companies until the proper exit time, and may not be ready to take on a new investment until a current company has exited because of management availability. Likewise, the amount of money raised may be inaccurate as a proxy because many times they simply correspond to a rollover process of investment from one project to the next. To further elaborate, when a VC fund exits a portfolio company, investment is then returned to their original investors, who many times become repeat clients to the VC fund and reinvest their desired level of capital back into the fund, which then represents the way capital is re-utilized in a VC fund. Another reason why the amount of money raised may not show a logical pattern to actual investment is that VC funds may have not found what they consider high potential investments, and may decide to wait and keep the funds sitting until an opportune venture is found.
In contrast, data on VC disbursements is exactly the capital given a designation into a venture company, and best represents the activity of VC on the supply side regarding investment level of funds. This variable is best suited to identify how much capital has been put into VC-backed companies in each industry and country. It is more interesting to see whether one industry or country is spending more or less in relative terms; and moreover, what type of impact has it had on the ability of each portfolio company to reach an exit stage.
For our probit analysis we employ the average investment per firm (in millions of Euro), classified by industry and country, over the two sub-periods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009 ). Since we do not have data for all firms, we compute average investment based on the total reported, divided by the number of firms that reported the amount of funds received, rather than the total number of firms. A priori, one would expect that the larger the amount of resources devoted to a representative firm belonging to a particular industry, the more likely it will be that this representative firm has a successful exit.
Gross Domestic Product
A high level of aggregate economic activity might indicate favorable entrepreneurial conditions; as periods of increased GDP might indicate that possibilities to commercialize technological innovations have increased (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000) . Given that we are using averages over time and not a year-byyear analysis, we opt for using average GDP per capita (in thousands of Euro), for each of the sub-periods, and for every country of interest. We would expect in general that higher GDP per capita should be associated with a higher likelihood of a successful VC project. Since several studies that use cross-country data also control for real GDP growth as a determinant of VC investment (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Gomes Santana Felix, Gulamhussen and Pires, 2007) , we run a separate set of regressions employing real growth instead of GDP per capita. The results, which are presented in Tables B and C in the Appendix, suggest that our main findings are robust to the use of this alternative measure of economic activity.
Research and Development Expenditures
VC investments are high-risk, high-reward projects, which makes them comparable with R&D investments. Thus, an increase in domestic expenditure on R&D would imply a greater supply of resources raised which are available for VC and also demand for similar high-tech, high-risk companies. When R&D is better funded, the chances of technological and other advanced science opportunities should increase and may dually lead to more VC ventures.
In expectation, times during which investments in R&D are higher might indicate more technological or innovative opportunities. Besides the idea that R&D spending might capture demand effects over time, it might also capture demand effects across countries. Therefore, countries with higher levels of R&D spending might contain a higher number of entrepreneurs with potentially fruitful ideas. This effect has been described by Gompers and Lerner (1998) who show, within the U.S., that states with higher levels of both academic and corporate R&D spending also have higher levels of VC financing activity.
Our analysis controls therefore for aggregate R&D per capita, also for both subperiods (1985-1999 and 2000-2009) , and all countries in our sample. All other things equal, a larger amount of funds devoted for R&D would be associated with higher technological or innovative opportunities, and therefore, higher likelihood of success of VC-financed projects.
Regulatory Environment and Legal Variables
Previous literature has shown that for all countries that want to increase successful VC investments it is vital to remove obstacles that hamper the growth of their financial markets, in particular their VC market. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1998) examine the determinants of VC fundraising in the U.S. They study industry-aggregate, state-level, and firm-specific fundraising to determine if macroeconomic, regulatory, or performance factors affect VC activity and conclude that the regulatory environment and indicators of the legal system play a crucial role. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) also highlight the impact of legal and institutional factors on exit strategies when comparing U.S. and Canadian venture financing. In sum, most previous papers conclude that countries with a weak tradition of equity culture and limited asset mobility should ensure that administrative and regulatory obstacles are minimized to enable innovative companies to get the VC financing and exit opportunities they need (Myers, 1999; Jaffee and Levonian, 2001; Ferreira and Ferreira, 2006; Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg, 2007 We proceed with our sample of 13 European countries and across the six industries of interest. Given the documented differences in performance of VC-funded firms in the U.S. and Europe, we run the regressions with and without the U.S., to verify if the main results at the industry level still apply.
We also add industry-specific dummy variables to test whether there are significant differences between industries in regards to the probability of success.
Specifically, we will use the Non-high tech sector as the benchmark for comparison. This broad sector comprises firms of the following industries: business services, agricultural, forestry, financial services, utilities, manufacturing, transportation, construction, chemicals and materials, pollution and recycling, industrial equipment, oil and gas exploration, consumer products, entertainment and leisure, and food and beverage; and it represents 34% and 52% of all firms receiving VC funding for the U.S. and the EU-13, respectively.
Estimation procedure
For our multivariate specification, the nature of the data set would a priori be suitable for a panel data analysis. Nonetheless, this may prove counterproductive given that, for some countries and industries, there are only very few observations of VC funded firms and exits; and this very well may both provide some unusually high weights to these observations and rather awkward results for years in which no exits were recorded. An example of this is the Biotech industry for Portugal, Italy and Austria: between 1985 and 2005, only 4, 6, and 9 Biotech firms received VC funds, respectively; which would leave several years with missing information or just one data point.
Instead, we proceed to separate the data into the two same sub-periods as in our descriptive analysis (before and after 2000), and estimate the model via a probit model, in which we try to determine the importance of each of the explanatory variables in predicting the likelihood of success of a VC-backed firm. As a result of missing observations -mainly with respect to the available information on average investment per firm -we are forced to limit our sample to analyzing exits for 33,358 (12,477 for 1985-1999; and 20,881 from 2000 onwards) .
The results are reported as follows: In a first step, we differentiate between the two successful exit strategies: exit via IPO and exit via M&A. In a second step, we run separate probit regressions for infant and mature firms. Anti-Director Rights (and lower scores of Creditor Rights) are associated with a higher probability of exit via M&A, but once we exclude the U.S. data from the sample only Anti-Director Rights remains significant.
IV.1 Explaining Success by Exit Strategy
<Insert Table VI 
IV.2 Explaining Success by Life Cycle
In the following we also investigate whether the life cycle of the VC-backed firms might play a pivotal role in the determination of successful exits. Table VII presents <Insert Table VII 
IV.3 General Discussion
In sum, we have observed that higher levels of average investment are linked to better performance by VC-backed firms going public, when considering the period after 2000.
This does not come as a big surprise. Campbell and Kraeussl (2007) determining which paths will be more likely conducive to successful exits of VC-backed firms.
We can conclude that while we have indeed observed a better performance in the U.S. vis-à-vis Europe before the end of the 1990s, most of it has been a result of the American infant firms performing better than their European counterparts. After 2000, the gap has closed, but mostly due to a sharp reduction in the percentage of American VC-backed firms that have successfully gone public. The gap with respect to infant firms has however not narrowed: European countries are still experiencing a great deal of trouble in making seed/start-up and early stage firms into successful ventures, irrespective of the type of industry they belong to.
V Conclusion
Previous research has concluded that the success of VC-backed firms depends on a large number of factors, many of which are quite specific. The contribution of this paper consists of explaining the difference in success documented in the literature between U.S.
and European VC financing. It has been suggested that, although the European VC industry has undergone substantial development and growth over the past two decades, a distinct gap in performance still exists. By looking at specific factors that include a venture"s industry and financing stage (which we argue may also determine in part venture capitalists" success in exiting their investments), we attempt to explain this performance gap.
Indeed, our findings show that differences in the rates of success and thus performance are only partly due to the intrinsic differences between the U.S. and European VC experiences. We find that industry-specific characteristics play an important role -in particular, our results suggest that the relatively higher success rate found in VC-backed biotech firms, for instance, may be mostly due to the intrinsic dynamic nature of this sector, and less to where the firms are located and where the funds come from.
We were also interested in analyzing whether substantial differences across industries and countries arise when looking separately at the success" rate of firms that have received VC at the seed/start-up and early stage versus firms that received funding at later stages. We also observe -confirming the findings of previous studies -that differences in the stage at which firms received VC funding tends to be a crucial determinant of success -mainly for European countries.
Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can be explained by country-specific factors (in particular, when considering seed/start-up and early stage firms), there are also important idiosyncratic differences across industries.
For instance, firms in the biotech and the medical, health and life science sectors tend to be significantly more likely to have a successful exit via IPO, while firms in the computer industry as well as in the communications and media sector are more prone to exit via merger or acquisition. Important differences across industries also emerge when considering infant versus mature firms, and their preferred exit.
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